William Berneau v. Cameron D. Martino, David M. Cameron : Brief of Appellee by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2009
William Berneau v. Cameron D. Martino, David M.
Cameron : Brief of Appellee
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Todd A. Turnbloom; Victoria K. Kidman & Associates; Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees.
Mark T. Flickinger; Brett R. Boulton; Flickinger & Sutterfield, P.C.; Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, William Berneau v. Cameron D. Martino, David M. Cameron, No. 20090134.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2902




CAMERON D. MARTINO, aka DAVID 
M. CAMERON; and THE ESTATE OF 
CAMERON D. MARTINO aka DAVID 
M. CAMERON, 
Defendants/Appellee. Case No.: 20090134-SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT 
JOSPEH C. FRATTO. 
Mark T. Flickenger 
Brett R. Boulton 
FLICKENGER & SUTTERFIELD 
3000 N. University Ave, Suite 300 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Todd A. Turnblom, #: 7331 
Tajha L. Ferrara, Bar #: 10631 
VICTORIA K. KIDMAN & ASSOCIATES 
P.O. Box 457000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellee 




The putative estate and/or next of kin of 
Cameron D. Martino, David Martino, 
appearing specially. 
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: 
Kevin J. Sutterfield 
Mark T. Flickinger 
Brett R. Boulton 
Flickinger & Sutterfield, P.C. 
3000 N. University Ave., #300 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 370-0505 
Facsimile: (801) 343-0954 
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES 
Todd A. Turnblom, Utah Bar # 7331 
Tajha L. Ferrara, Bar #: 10631 
Victoria K. Kidman & Associates 
P.O. Box 457000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Telephone: (801)257-7200 
Facsimile: (801)257-7215 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 5 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 6 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT 7 
I. Utah law bars claims raised more than three years after death where no personal 
representative has been appointed. 7 
A. Case law from other jurisdictions supports a bar to the plaintiff's claims. 10 
B. Commentary supports a bar to plaintiff's claims. 12 
II. Section 803(4)(B) does not create a new cause of action. 13 
A. No cause of action against a decedent alone is created by Section 803. 13 
B. Section 75-3-803 is not applicable. 14 
C. A deceased person is not a proper party. 14 
D. Utah law does not allow a lawsuit against the tortfeasor's insurer. 15 




TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATUTES 
Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. 18-A, §3-803(c) 11 
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 18-A, § 3-104 10 
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 18-A, § 3-108 11 
Utah Code Ann. §75-3-104 7,8,9, 12, 13, 14, 19 
Utah Code Ann. §75-3-107 7,8,9, 12, 13, 14, 19 
Utah Code Ann. §75-3-301 8 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-802 13 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-307 9, 16 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-1-101 and -102 7 
CASES 
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998) 20 
Campbell v. Stagg, 596 P.2d 1037, 1039 (Utah 1979) 17 
Davis County v. Jensen, 2003 UT App 444, 1J10, 83 P.3d 405 17 
Davis County v. Progressive Northwestern Ins. Co., 2008 UT App. 414, f7, 193 P.3d 669 
17 
Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, HI 41-45, 29 P.3d 638 16 
Hartv. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 20 
In re Estate of Kruzynski, 744 A.2d 1054 (Me. 2000) 10, 12, 15,21 
RULES 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 17(a) 15 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 25(a) 16 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(b) 10 
ii 
STATEMENT OF JlIUISI>i<"'I'll)I { 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78A-3- lu2< ^ > I 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
s the three year statute of limitations period set f-Ti! =: ..tah Code Ann. § 75-
.. against a deceased tortfeasor where no 
personal representative was ever appointed as required f 
M JNDARJI ill- REVIEW: 
Whetl' : . ' . . - . i auoiu u !\n , ^ appellant's claim 
is a question o) kiw. and is re\ lewed for correctness. In rt} / - /••-... !~ • • •  ir », 
"""f i . •- - iius.^eii Packard Development., fnc \ Carson, 2005 I I i-i, *, .6, 
108P.3d741. 
ISSUE II: 
Does 11 (all Code Annotated § 75-3-803(4)(b) create a new cause of action, to 
allow a claim against a dn'rilr n i i n, w\\\\ n i|„ pendcnl «|,|l Ihe decedent's estate and 
anv personal representative, thereby avoiding the requirements of Utah (\nk *IIII : 
S1ANDA.W OFfcEVlEW: 
The standard of re\ieu for the interpretation of a rule or statute is for correctness. 
S((fft< v AVer*/:;1,, ' - ^ V * \ ^ ' , ; iaii r /w - j . : ' -
1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
§ 75-3-104. Claims against decedent—Necessity of administration 
No proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of a decedent or his 
successors may be revived or commenced before the appointment of a 
personal representative. After the appointment and until distribution, all 
proceedings and actions to enforce a claim against the estate are governed 
by the procedure prescribed by this Chapter 3. After distribution a creditor 
whose claim has not been barred may recover from the distributees as 
provided in Section 75-3-1004 or from a former personal representative 
individually liable as provided in Section 75-3-1005. This section has no 
application to a proceeding by a secured creditor of the decedent to enforce 
his right to his security except as to any deficiency judgment which might 
be sought therein. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-104 (1993) 
§ 75-3-107, Probate, testacy, and appointment proceedings—Ultimate time limit-
Presumption and order of intestacy 
(1) No informal probate or appointment proceeding or formal testacy or 
appointment proceeding, other than a proceeding to probate a will 
previously probated at the testator's domicile and appointment proceedings 
relating to an estate in which there has been a prior appointment, may be 
commenced more than three years after the decedent's death, except: 
(a) If a previous proceeding was dismissed because of doubt about 
the fact of the decedent's death, appropriate probate, appointment, or 
testacy proceedings may be maintained at any time thereafter upon a 
finding that the decedent's death occurred prior to the initiation of the 
previous proceeding and the applicant or petitioner has not delayed 
unduly in initiating the subsequent proceeding. 
(b) Appropriate probate, appointment, or testacy proceedings may be 
maintained in relation to the estate of an absent, disappeared, or missing 
person for whose estate a conservator has been appointed, at any time 
within three years after the conservator becomes able to establish the 
death of the protected person. 
(c) A proceeding to contest an informally probated will and to secure 
appointment of the person with legal priority for appointment in the 
event the contest is successful, may be commenced within the later of 
twelve months from the informal probate or three years from the 
decedent's death. 
2 
(2) The limitations provided in Subsection (1) do not apply to 
proceedings to construe probated wills or determine heirs of an intestate. In 
cases under Subsection (l)(a) or (b), the date on which a testacy or 
appointment proceeding is properly commenced shall be deemed to be the 
date of the decedent's death for purposes of other limitations provisions of 
this title which relate to the date of death. 
(3) If no will is probated within three years from death, the presumption 
of intestacy is final and the court shall enter an order to that effect and 
provide for the distribution of the decedent's property in accordance with 
the laws of intestacy under Title 75, Chapter 2, Part 1, The court has 
continuing jurisdiction to handle all matters necessary to distribute the 
decedent's property, including jurisdiction to determine what property was 
owned by the decedent at the time of death. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-107 (1993) 
§ 75-3-803. Limitations on presentation of claims 
(1) All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the death of 
the decedent, including claims of the state and any subdivision of it, 
whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or 
unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis, if not barred 
earlier by other statute of limitations, are barred against the estate, the 
personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless 
presented within the earlier of the following dates: 
(a) one year after the decedent's death; or 
(b) within the time provided by Subsection 75-3-801(2) for creditors 
who are given actual notice, and where notice is published, within the 
time provided in Subsection 75-3-801 (1) for all claims barred by 
publication. 
(2) In all events, claims barred by the nonclaim statute at the decedent's 
domicile are also barred in this state. 
(3) All claims against a decedent's estate which arise at or after the 
death of the decedent, including claims of the state and any of its 
subdivisions, whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, 
liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis are 
barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and 
devisees of the decedent, unless presented as follows: 
(a) a claim based on a contract with the personal representative 
within three months after performance by the personal representative is 
due; or 
(b) any other claim within the later of three months after it arises, or 
the time specified in Subsection (l)(a). 
3 
(4) Nothing in this section affects or prevents: 
(a) any proceeding to enforce any mortgage, pledge, or other lien 
upon property of the estate; 
(b) to the limits of the insurance protection only, any proceeding to 
establish liability of the decedent or the personal representative for 
which he is protected by liability insurance; or 
(c) collection of compensation for services rendered and 
reimbursement for expenses advanced by the personal representative or 
by the attorney or accountant for the personal representative of the 
estate. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803 (1993) 
4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff, William Berneau, claims injury from an accident that occurred on 
September 23, 2003, which he alleges is the fault of the decedent, Cameron D. Martino. 
The decedent died on December 12, 2003, from causes unrelated to the accident. 
Plaintiff first filed a lawsuit naming Cameron D. Martino on September 14, 2007, in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court. That lawsuit was eventually dismissed by that court for 
failure to serve, under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(b). The plaintiff, then 
knowing of the death and that no personal representative was appointed, filed his second 
action on August 1, 2008. At that time the plaintiff named as defendants the decedent 
Cameron D. Martino and "the estate o f the decedent. No type of probate matter was 
ever pursued to name a personal representative for decedent. The defendant appeared 
specially below and filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs claims were 
now barred by Sections 75-3-104 and 75-3-107 of the Utah Code. The trial court agreed 
in a memorandum decision dated January 16, 2009, and filed January 21, 2009. The final 
Order of Dismissal was signed by the trial court on January 17, 2009, and filed the next 
day. The plaintiff has appealed from that order. 
5 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. The plaintiff, William Berneau, and the decedent, Cameron D. Martino, were 
involved in a minor rear-end accident on September 23, 2003. Complaint, Record at 2, f 
10; police records, R. 39; Order of Dismissal, R. 118. 
2. The decedent died on December 12, 2003, from causes unrelated to the accident. 
Complaint, R. 2, % 4; Utah Certificate of Death, R. 48; and Order of Dismissal, R. 118. 
3. The plaintiffs first complaint was filed on September 14, 2007, in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court and named as the defendant Cameron D. Martino. Complaint, R. 2, 
Tf 5; and a copy of the court docket for that case, FL. 50 to 51. 
4. That action was dismissed for failure to serve on February 27, 2008 by the Fourth 
Judicial District Court. See Complaint, R. 2, f 6, and docket, R. 51. 
5. The plaintiff filed this action on August 1, 2008, more than three years after 
decedent's death. Complaint, R. 1; Order of Dismissal, R. 118-119. 
6. At that time, the plaintiff knew of the death of Cameron D. Martino and that no 
representative had been appointed. See Complaint, R. 2, f^ 6 and 7. 
7. No type of probate case has been pursued regarding the decedent, and there has 
never been an Estate of Cameron D. Martino. See Complaint, R. 2, f 7; Order of 
Dismissal, R. 118. 
6 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Utah Uniform Probate Code provides several limitations on the time periods 
during which a person making a claim against a deceased person must present or file their 
claims. Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-104 requires a personal representative to be 
appointed before commencing or reviving a claim. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-107, with 
certain irrelevant exceptions, prohibits appointing a personal representative more than 
three years after the death of the decedent. These two sections together create a statutory 
bar to any claim against a decedent if no personal representative is appointed within three 
years from the death of a decedent. 
Other statutory sections of the code create additional limitations periods. 
Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803 provides additional limitations if a personal 
representative is appointed, and also provides exceptions to those limitations. However, 
the exceptions of Section 75-3-803 apply only to the limitations found in 75-3-803, not 
those found in Section 75-3-104 and 75-3-107. The plaintiff in this case, even after 
learning about the death of the decedent, never attempted to comply with the requirement 
to appoint a personal representative, and no personal representative was ever appointed. 
Given this, the plaintiffs claims are barred by Section 75-3-107. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Utah law bars claims raised more than three years after death where no personal 
representative has been appointed. 
The Utah legislature long ago adopted the Utah Uniform Probate Code as Title 75 
of the Utah Code. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-1-101 and -102. There are numerous 
7 
provisions of the probate code that provide a time limitation that may bar a plaintiffs 
claims against a decedent. Two are relevant to this matter. The limitations found in Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 75-3-104 and 75-3-107 will be discussed in this section. Together they 
operate to bar the plaintiffs claim in the underlying action. The plaintiff argues an 
exception exists in the form of Section 75-3-803, which he apparently argues creates a 
special cause of action. This section of the brief will address the statutory bar found in 
Sections 75-3-104 and 75-3-107. Section II will address the exception the plaintiff 
claims pursuant to Section 75-3-803. 
The Probate Code addresses the obvious difficulty of pursuing claims against a 
deceased person by requiring that a personal representative must be appointed before 
such claims are commenced or revived. This requirement is found in Part 3 of the Code, 
Section 75-3-104, which states: 
No proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of a decedent or his 
successors may be revived or commenced before the appointment of a 
personal representative. After the appointment and until distribution, all 
proceedings and actions to enforce a claim against the estate are governed 
by the procedure prescribed by this Chapter 3... 
This requirement to appoint a personal representative does not leave those who 
have claims against a decedent without recourse, as they are interested parlies who may 
petition the court to appoint the required personal representative. See e.g. Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-3-301. However, claimants may not delay in filing claims against a decedent 
as Part 3 of the Code also provides a statute of limitations of three years that limits the 
time period in which these claims can be filed. This is found in Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-
107. The relevant portions of that statute are as follows: 
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(I) No informal probate or appointment proceeding or formal testacy or 
appointment proceeding, other than a proceeding to probate a will 
previously probated at the testator's domicile and appointment proceedings 
relating to an estate in which there has been a prior appointment, may be 
commenced more than three years after the decedent's death... 
(emphasis added). The statute goes on to list several exceptions, none of which are 
applicable to this case. Together, sections 75-3-104 and 75-3-107 require that, in all 
claims against a deceased person, a personal representative must be sought within three 
years. If this is not done, no claim against the decedent may be "revived or commenced," 
what the title to Section 75-3-107 calls the "ultimate time limit" to file an action against a 
decedent. 
In this matter, the decedent died on December 12, 2003. No type of filing 
requesting a personal representative was filed by the plaintiff or any other person before 
December 12, 2006, three years after his death. However, the plaintiff filed a prior 
lawsuit in the name of the decedent on September 14, 2007, delaying until just before the 
general statute of limitations, found in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-307, would have run. 
There is no evidence the plaintiff attempted to serve this lawsuit and it was eventually 
dismissed for failure to serve, pursuant to Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The plaintiff filed his second lawsuit on August 1, 2008. Even though the Complaint 
references the death of the decedent and that no probate had been attempted, the plaintiff 
did not seek appointment of a personal representative or attempt to comply with Section 
75-3-104 in any way. As there was no attempt to comply with Utah Law, the plaintiffs 
claims are barred by Section 75-3-803 
9 
A, Case law from other jurisdictions supports a bar to the plaintiffs claims. 
A Utah Court has not examined these sections of the Probate Code. However, 
case law from other jurisdiction that have adopted the same language from the Uniform 
Probate Code are instructive. In the case of In re Estate of Kruzynski, 744 A.2d 1054 
(Me. 2000), the Supreme Court of Maine construed nearly identical language in sections 
of the Uniform Probate Code adopted by Maine In Kruzynski, Levine, who was fifteen 
years old at the time, was injured in an automobile collision on August 20, 1992. The 
tortfeasor, Kruzynski, died on October 3, 1993. Levine did not learn of the tortfeasor's 
death for at least three years and later filed a petition to have herself appointed a personal 
representative in order to pursue her claim. Id. at 1055, ^ [ 2 to 3 
The Maine statute which is comparable to Utah's Section 75-3-104 is Me, Rev. 
Stat. Ann. 18-A, § 3-104. Aside from cross-references to other sections of the statutes, 
the Maine statute text is identical to Utah's Section 75-3-104, and is as follows: 
No proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of a decedent or his 
successors may be revived or commenced before the appointment of a 
personal representative. After the appointment and until distribution, all 
proceedings and actions to enforce a claim against the estate are governed 
by the procedure prescribed by this Article. After distribution a creditor 
whose claim has not been barred may recover from the distributees as 
provided in section 3-1004 or from a former personal representative 
individually liable as provided in section 3-1005. This section has no 
application to a proceeding by a secured creditor of the decedent to enforce 
his right to his security except as to any deficiency judgment which might 
be sought therein. 
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 18-A, § 3-104. The Maine statute which is comparable to Utah's 
Section 75-3-107 is Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 18-A, § 3-108. The language relevant to both 
Kruzynski and this case is also identical in this Maine Statute: 
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...no informal probate or appointment proceeding or formal testacy or 
appointment proceeding, other than a proceeding to probate a will 
previously probated at the testator's domicile and appointment proceedings 
relating to an estate in which there has been a prior appointment, may be 
commenced more than 3 years after the decedent's death... 
Me. Rev. Stat, Ann. 18-A, § 3-108.1 Facing these statutes, the plaintiff in Kruzinski faced 
the same bar as does the plaintiff in this case. See Kruzynski, supra, f 7. 
In Kruzynski, Levine argued, as does plaintiff in this case, that Maine's version of 
Section 75-3-803(d), Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 18-A, § 3-803(c), provided an exception which 
would allow her to pursue her claim. Id. ^ 5. "[Levine] wants us to hold that, when there 
is a personal injury claim against an estate and that claim is only for the amount of 
liability insurance held by the decedent, there is no time limit for the appointment of the 
personal representative." Id. The Maine Supreme Court rejected this claim, noting: 
Neither section 3-803(a), limiting the time within which claims must be 
presented, nor section 3-803(c)(2), the liability insurance exception, are 
applicable in this case because their application would be premature. 
Claims cannot be presented to an estate until there is a personal 
representative. No personal representative was ever designated for 
Kruzynski's estate. 
Id., <[( 6 (emphasis added). The Maine Supreme Court therefore affirmed the trial court's 
dismissal in Kruzynski. Id. If 10. Like the Court found in Kruzynski, in Utah claims 
against a decedent cannot be revived or commenced until a personal representative is 
appointed. Where no personal representative is appointed within the three year period 
after the death, the claims are barred. 
1
 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 18-A, § 3-108 is different from Utah's statute in two respects. First, 
it provides the language from the Uniform Probate Code applies only to deaths after 
January 1, 1981, with different language for deaths before that date, and second, Utah 
added subsection 75-?-107(3). Neither difference is relevant for this analysis. 
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B. Commentary supports a bar to plaintiffs claims. 
The commentary included in the Uniform Probate Code, and included in the Utah 
Uniform Probate Code, also supports a statute of limitations that bars plaintiffs claim. 
The commentary for Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-104 states as follows, 'This and sections of 
Part 8, Article III, are designed to force creditors of decedents to assert their claims 
against duly appointed personal representatives." Though Utah Code Ann, § 75-3-802 is 
not at issue here, its commentary from the Uniform Code is instructive, "It [Section 802] 
implies also that after the expiration of four months from death, the normal statute of 
limitations may run and bar a claim even though the non-claim provisions of Section 3-
803 have not been triggered. Hence, the non-claim and limitation provisions of Section 
3-803 are not mutually exclusive." That comment goes on to list various ways a claim 
may be barred, which are not mutually exclusive. 
The trial court below also cited the Editorial Board Comment to Section 75-3-107, 
which states, in part, 
All creditor's claims are barred after three years from death. See § 75-3-
803(1 )(b) [which now prescribes shorter periods after notice to creditors]. 
Because of this, and since any time would be seen as a "cloud" on the title 
of heirs or devisees otherwise secure under § 75-3-101, the three-year 
statute of limitations applies to bar appointment of a personal representative 
after the basic period has passed... 
R. 108.2 The key to these comments is that there are a number of statutory provisions 
that act as statutes of limitation. They are not mutually exclusive, and any may bar the 
claims of an untimely claimant. In this case, the three year limitations period of Utah's 
2
 This Editorial Board Comment is not found in the current comments to Section 107, but 
is found in the 1993 printed version of that statute. 
12 
Section 75-3-107 bus the claim as neither the plaintiff nor anyone else petitioned to 
appoint a personal representative for the decedent as Section 75-3-104 icqinies piim to 
pursuing any claims. 
II. Section 803(4)(B) ct«« mil n n i i u n i \\ cause of action, 
A. No cause of action against a decedent alone is created by Section 803. 
Much of the plaintil'l ;; brief argues that Utah Code Ann. 75-3-803(4)(b) creates a 
method for him to pursue a claim without regard to the remaindt-; M !'* ^bate Code. 
Section 75-3-803 generally deals with how creditors of an estate must present claims 
when a personal representative has been appointed, and provides time limits when a 
personal representative is appointed. The specific language the plaintiff looks to is in 
paragraph four of this section, which states, "(4) Nothing in this section affects or 
pre vents :...(b) to the limits of the insurance protection only, any proceeding to establish 
liability of the decedent or the personal representative for which he is protected by 
liability insurance " Id. 
Plaintiff particularly focuses on the word ;;or" to make the novel argument that the 
"plain language" of this statute is that the legislature authorized Plaintiff to file a cl.um 
against "the decedent" separately from the personal representative, and thereby avoid the 
requirements that a personal representative be appointed Brief of Appellants, 11, 12 
(citing HUF v. W.P.W., 2009 UT 10, % 32, 203 P.3d 943.). When read in context, the 
plain language is that the exception to the limitations set out in Section 75-3-803 applies 
to those types of proceedings that must establish what the liability of the decedent or the 
personal representative is, when that liability would be covered by insurance. It does not 
B 
create a new class of cases where the only defendant is a deceased person without a 
representative. It also does not exempt the plaintiff from the requirement of Section 75-
3-104 to seek to appoint a personal representative before pursing the claim. 
B. Section 75-3-803 is not applicable. 
Regardless of whether a separate action against a dead person is possible, Section 
75-3-803(4) is not applicable to this case. By the plain meaning of its words, paragraph 4 
applies only to the limitations provisions of section 75-3-803, "(4) Nothing in this section 
affects or prevents..." (emphasis added). The Legislature could easily have written 
"Nothing in this title" if it had wished Section 75-3-803 to exempt a plaintiff from all 
statutes of limitations in the Probate Code. However, the legislature very clearly limited 
the exceptions in paragraph 4 to those limitations periods set out in Section 75-3-803. As 
was stated in the Kruzynski case, neither the general provisions of Section 75-3-803, nor 
the exceptions in Section 75-3-803(4) are applicable "because their application would be 
premature." See Kruzynski, supra p. 1056, f 6. Section 75-3-803 governs when claims 
can be presented to a personal representative and when they will be barred under those 
procedures. Where no representative is appointed and it is no longer possible to appoint a 
representative, as is the result of filings that do not comply with Utah's Sections 75-3-104 
and 75-3-107, Section 75-3-803 in its entirety never becomes applicable. 
G A deceased person is not a proper party. 
It is not possible to create a fiction that it is "the decedent" being sued and no 
personal representative or other proper defendant is involved. Common sense would 
indicate that a dead person cannot be a party to a lawsuit. Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of 
14 
Civil Procedure provides, "[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party 
in interest..." Utah has little case law about how and whether this applies to defendai its, 
or the capacity for defendants to be sued. The closest case is Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 
62, Iflf 41-45, 29 P.3d 638, in which I his court held a personal injury plaintiff could not 
join the insurer as a real party defendant. 
Utah's Rules of Civil Procedure clearly do not contemplate allowing a proceeding 
to continue in the name of a deceased person alone, as Rule 25(a) requires the 
substitution of a party within ninety days of when death is suggested upon the records. 
Therefore, if this case were to proceed in the name of the decedent, a suggestion of death 
would be appropriate. As 110 personal representative may now be appointed, Rule 25(a) 
would then require dismissal of the action within 90 days. This procedure would be 
nonsensical if Utah law allowed suits against a decedent alone. 
D. Utah law does not allow a lawsuit a^aum tlh* hwtfea\nii \ insurer. 
The plaintiff makes many references to the decedent's insurer, but avoids arguing 
that he should be allowed to make a claim directly against the insurer. Instead, he argues 
he should be allowed to make a claim in the decedent's name, but without "disturbing" or 
otherwise involving the family of the decedent. See Brief of Appellant, at 14. However, 
creating a fiction that the deceased person is a defendant \* ffh the capacity to be sued as 
the named defendant is simply a de facto direct action against the insurer of a tortfeasor. 
This is clearly contrary to the law of the State of Utah. "In Utah, a plaintiff must 
direct his action against the actual tortfeasor, not the insurer " Campbell v. Stagg, 596 
P.2d 1037, 1039 (Utah 1979). "Utah adheres to the general rule, that in the absence of a 
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contractual provision or a statute or ordinance to the contrary, the absence of privity of 
contract between the injured party and the tortfeasor's insurer bars a direct action by the 
injured party against the insurer in automobile insurance cases." Davis County v. Jensen, 
2003 UT App 444, TJ13, 83 P.3d 405 (citations, internal quotations and alterations 
omitted); see also Davis County v. Progressive Northwestern Ins. Co., 2008 UT App. 414, 
f 7, 193 P.3d 669 (cert den. 90 P.3d 1041). Plaintiffs argument that he should proceed in 
the name of the decedent to access insurance proceeds is little more than the creation of a 
legal fiction in order to overturn this long-established case law. 
Regardless, the plaintiff has not named any party that could be an appropriate 
defendant within either a three or a four year statute of limitations. If Section 75-3-803 is 
read to allow a claim against the insurer for the proceeds of the insurance policy, the 
plaintiff has never attempted to name the insurer as a party. Neither in his first nor in his 
second claim did he attempt to name the insurer as a party. The plaintiffs claims are 
therefore time barred as to the insurer even under the general four-year statute of 
limitations of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-307. Similarly, as the plaintiff has never 
attempted to name anyone in the capacity of a personal representative, any attempt to do 
so now would face a similar bar due to the general statute of limitations. 
III. It is plaintiff who bears the risk for not diligently pursing his claims. 
Throughout the plaintiffs pleadings and brief, he emphasizes the decedent's 
insurer, claims an "ongoing dialog" with the insurer, and claims other facts irrelevant to 
the application of Sections 104, 107 and 803. See generally, Brief of Appellant, p. 7-8, 
1HJ 6-12. Even though these allegations are made, the plaintiff never put into evidence 
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any correspondence or other evidence showing this "ongoing dialog" or other evidence to 
support these allegations. The only documents offered and included in the record v 
are: copies of the police report and exchange forms, a copy of the certificate of death, and 
a copy of the docket report oi I In prior case, eact1 f, ' were attached to the 
defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, R. 38-51. A single I tier, 
dated February ? .(»»)83 was attached to the Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss, R. 70. The only document attached In llic plaintiffs pleadings on the motion 
was a copy of Section 75-3-803. R. 62 and 63. 
The one bit of this alleged "ongoing dialog" that the trial court had before it to 
consider is a follow-up letter noting the claim adjustor •* ounsel's paralegal 
on October 4, 2007 and informed her she had learned of decedent's death. The letter also 
informed counsel she was closing the file. Despite this prior telephonic notice and letter, 
the plaintiff did nothing with regard to the pending case, and it was dismissed on 
February 27, 2008 by Judge Claudia Laycock of the Fourth Judicial Court, pursuant to 
Rule4(b). See R. 51. 
The record establishes that plaintiff waited until September 17, 2007 to file his 
first Complaint. Plaintiff chose to wait until nine days before the general statute of 
limitations would have run to Jik In t Lnnt, No evidence was ever produced that the 
decedent, his successors, or his insurer had any influence in this choice. The first lawsuit 
was dismissed for failure to serve on February 27, 2008, five months and ten days after it 
3
 It appears that plaintiff cites this letter in his statement of facts as f 10, but instead cites 
the date he supposedly received the letter, February 4, 2008. 
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was filed. This was three and a half months after plaintiff was notified by telephone of 
the tortfeasor's death, and twenty-three days after receiving the February 1, 2008 letter. 
There has been no evidence presented that the plaintiff ever attempted to have the first 
suit served or took other action to preserve that case. Again, plaintiff chose this course of 
action; there has been no evidence presented that the decedent, his successors, or his 
insurer had any influence in this decision. Similarly, there is no information presented 
that the plaintiff sought appointment of a personal representative or otherwise attempted 
to comply with the requirements of the law prior to the filing of this action on August 1, 
2008. Even then, the plaintiff only sought to pursue a claim through a strained reading of 
Section 75-3-803, ignoring all other requirements of the probate code. Again, plaintiff 
made these choices. They were not made by the decedent, his successors, or his insurer. 
Plaintiff made no claims in the trial court for equitable relief from any statute of 
limitations or procedures, or any claims other than insisting a cause of action pursuant to 
75-3-803 exists. He should not be able to raise such claims now, either explicitly or by 
implication. 
...[T]o preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must first raise the 
issue in the trial court. That is, a trial court must be offered an opportunity 
to rule on an issue. A trial court has the opportunity to rule if the following 
three requirements are met: (1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; 
(2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce 
supporting evidence or relevant legal authority. 
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998) (citations and internal 
quotations omitted), see also Hart v. Salt Lake County Cornm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1997). The plaintiff did not sufficiently raise any issues outside of Section 75-3-
18 
803 pursuant to this standard. Given this, he should not raise alleged facts and inferences 
related to other issues, not relevant to the issues on appeal, which are 1ti hunt ami 
exceptions set forth in Section 75-3-104, 75-3-107, and 75-3-803 of the Utah Uniform 
Probate Code. To raise other facts and allegations in the appeal without providing 
evidence of them in the trial court below prevents the appellee from responding with 
legal arguments and *; porting evidence, and denies the trial court the opportunity to rule 
upon them. 
The relevant facts that were presented and ruled upon by the trial court, were 
included in the Order of Dismissal, "this matter arises from an accident that occurred on 
September 23, 2003; the driver who would have been the pnpt i defendant, Cameron 
Martino died on December 3, 2003; no probate or other proceeding to appoint a personal 
representative was ever filed: and this matter was not filed until more than three years 
after the death of Cameron Martino." It is these facts that must he applied to Sections 75-
3-104 and 75-3-107, which support the trial court's dismissal below. 
CONCLUSION 
The law adopted by the Utah State legislature provides for an \ - ^ ^ 
in which claims against a decedent may no longer be pursued. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-
104 requires a personal representative to be appointed before a lawsuit may be "revived 
or commenced." Section 75-3-107 provides a bar against all such actions not filed three 
years from decedent's death, as was recognized by the Maine Supreme Court in 
Kruzynski, supra. As no personal representative was appointed. Section 75-3-803 is not 
applicable. Even if it were, the exception is limited by the wording of section 75-3-803 
19 
to only the limitations provisions set forth in Section 75-3-803. Therefore, this Court 
should uphold the order of the trial court below, and find that the plaintiffs claims in this 
matter are barred. 
DATED this IQ^ day of June, 2009. 
Victoria K. Kidman & Associates 
)lom 
Tajha L. Ferrara 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
20 
ADDENDUM 
1. Memorandum Decision, R. 102-110 
2. Order of Dismissal, R 118-120 
3. Complaint, R. 1-4 
4. Certificate of Death, R. 48 
5. February 1, 2008 Letter, R. 70 
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CAMERON D. MARTINO, AKA DAVID 
M. CAMERON; AND THE ESTATE OF 
CAMERON D. MARTINO AKA DAVID M. 
CAMERON, 
Defendant. 
.ftnt t D 
JAN 21 2009 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
MEMORANDl^^^<^PARTMENT 
Case No. 080915531 
Hon. JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. 
January 16, 2009 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff's Motion to Strike. 
The Court heard oral argument with respect to the motions on 
January 9, 2009. Following the hearing, the matters were taken 
under advisement. 
The Court having considered the motions and memoranda and 
for the good cause shown, hereby enters the following ruling. 
Specifically, this matter presents itself the result of an 
automobile accident occurring on September 23, 2003. 
With the motion to dismiss, Defendant asserts the driver who 
would have been the proper defendant, Cameron Martino, died from 
causes unrelated to the accident on December 3, 2003. No probate 
or other proceeding to appoint a personal representative was ever 
BERNEAU v. MARTINO Page 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
presented. This is critical, argues Defendant, as the Utah 
statutes are explicit about the method to bring an action for 
claimed damages against the estate of a decedent. Indeed, 
asserts Defendant, Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-104 controls claims made 
against a decedent or his successors and provides: 
No proceeding to enforce a claim against the 
estate of a decedent or his successors may be 
revived or commenced before the appointment 
of a personal representative. After the 
appointment and until distribution, all 
proceedings and actions to enforce a claim 
against the estate are governed by the 
procedure prescribed by this Chapter 3. After 
distribution a creditor whose claim has not 
been barred may recover from the distributees 
as provided in Section 75-3-1004 or from a 
former personal representative individually 
liable as provided in Section 75-3-1005. This 
section has no application to a proceeding by 
a secured creditor of the decedent to enforce 
his right to his security except as to any 
deficiency judgment which might be sought 
therein. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-104. 
Moreover, contends Defendant, the statute of limitations for 
when such an action may be commenced is found in Utah Code Ann. § 
75-3-107, which provides the following in relevant part: 
(1) No informal probate or appointment 
proceeding or formal testacy or appointment 
proceeding, other than a proceeding to 
probate a will previously probated at the 
testator's domicile and appointment 
proceedings relating to an estate in which 
there has been a prior appointment, may be 
commenced more than three years after the 
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decedent's death. . .. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-107. 
In the instant, argues Defendant, no probate or other 
proceeding to appoint a personal representative was ever 
presented. Accordingly, asserts Defendant, the Utah statutes now 
bar any proceeding to appoint a special administrator or personal 
representative as well as any claims against the estate of the 
decedent. Consequently, contends Defendant, the Plaintiff's 
claims fail as a matter of law.1 
Plaintiff opposes the motion arguing the limitations on 
presentations of claims for creditors under the Utah Uniform 
Probate Code explicitly allows proceedings to establish the 
Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Strike Defendant's Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss arguing Defendant 
first asserted that a claim may not be made unless a personal 
representative has been appointed and in the Reply, Defendant now 
argues that the claim has abated. Because Defendant's reply 
argument is new and not rebuttal, contends Plaintiff, such should 
be stricken. 
Defendant opposes the motion arguing he did not raise new 
issues in his Reply. Indeed, asserts Defendant, his argument has 
always been that (1) Section 75-3-104 prohibits a claim against a 
decedent or his successors until a personal representative can be 
appointed, and (2) Section 75-3-107 prohibits that from occurring 
more than three years after the death. 
While the wording may not be optimal, the Court is not 
persuaded Defendant raised new issues with his Reply Memorandum. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion to Strike is, respectfully, 
denied. 
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liability of a decedent up to the limits of insurance protection 
for this auto collision after one year following the death of 
Defendant. Specifically, asserts Plaintiff, "The running of any 
statute of limitations measured from some other event than death 
and advertisement for claims against a decedent is suspended 
during the three months following the decedent's death but 
resumes thereafter as to claims not barred pursuant to the 
sections which follow." Utah Code Ann, § 75-3-802. In this 
case, contends Plaintiff, his claim is for personal injuries 
arising out of an automobile collision and not the Defendant's 
death. Therefore, argues Plaintiff, his claim is controlled by 
the four year statute of limitations found in Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-2~307(3) and suit was timely filed within four years. 
Indeed, asserts Plaintiff, in the sections that follow 
Section 802, the time limits for presenting any and all claims 
are, again, explicitly set forth under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803 
which provides: 
(1) All claims against a decedentfs estate 
which arose before the death of the decedent, 
including claims of the state and any 
subdivision of it, whether due or to become 
due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or 
unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or 
other legal basis, if not barred earlier by 
other statute of limitations, are barred 
against the estate, the personal 
representative, and the heirs and devisees of 
the decedent, unless presented within the 
earlier of the following dates: 
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(a) one year after the decedent's death; 
or 
(b) within the time provided by Subsection 
75-3-801(2) for creditors who are given 
actual notice, and where notice is published, 
within the time provided in Subsection 
75-3-801(1) for all claims barred by 
publication. 
(2) In all events, claims barred by the 
nonclaim statute at the decedent's domicile 
are also barred in this state. 
(3) All claims against a decedent's estate 
which arise at or after the death of the 
decedent, including claims of the state and 
any of its subdivisions, whether due or to 
become due, absolute or contingent, 
liquidated or unliquidated, founded on 
contract, tort, or other legal basis are 
barred against the estate, the personal 
representative, and the heirs and devisees of 
the decedent, unless presented as follows: 
(a) a claim based on a contract with the 
personal representative within three months 
after performance by the personal 
representative is due; or 
(b) any other claim within the later of 
three months after it arises, or the time 
specified in Subsection (1)(a). 
(4) Nothing in this section affects or 
prevents: 
(a) any proceeding to enforce any 
mortgage, pledge, or other lien upon property 
of the estate; 
(b) to the limits of the insurance 
protection only, any proceeding to establish 
liability of the decedent or the personal 
BERNEAU v. MARTINO Page 6 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
representative for which he is protected by 
liability insurance; or 
(c) collection of compensation for 
services rendered and reimbursement for 
expenses advanced by the personal 
representative or by the attorney or 
accountant for the personal representative of 
the estate. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803 {Emphasis added). 
This action arises from an accident which occurred more than 
five years ago. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-104 prohibits a claim 
against a decedent or his successors until a personal 
representative can be appointed. In this instant, it is 
undisputed no probate or other proceeding to appoint a personal 
representative has ever been presented. This said, Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-3-107 prohibits the presentation of such an action from 
occurring more than three years after the decedent's death. 
While Plaintiff seems to imply that he is bringing this 
action against the insurer (who is not a party) such an effort is 
contrary to Utah law in the absence of a contractual provision, 
statute or ordinance to the contrary. 
Finally, while Plaintiff has argued § 75-3-803 should apply 
as such sets forth the statute of limitations as to creditors, 
which he claims he is, it is important to note that in the 
Editorial Board Comment to Section 75-3-107 the following is 
stated: 
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All creditors1 claims are barred after three 
years from death. See § 75-3-803 (1) (b) [which 
now prescribes shorter periods after notice 
to creditors]. Because of this, and since any 
possibility that letters may be issued at any 
time would be seen as a "cloud" on the title 
of heirs or devisees otherwise secure under § 
75-3-101, the three-year statute of 
limitations applies to bar appointment of a 
personal representative after the basic 
period has passed. Section 83 of the Model 
Probate Code barred probate and 
administration after five years, and other 
statutes imposing time limits on these 
proceedings are cited at pp. 307-310 of Model 
Probate Code. A qualification covers the 
situation where a closed administration is 
sought to be reopened to administer 
after-discovered assets. See § 75-3-1008. If 
there has been no probate or appointment 
within three years, and if either exception 
to § 75-3-102 applies, devisees under a 
late-discovered will may use a will to 
establish their title. But, they may not 
secure probate of the will, nor may they 
obtain appointment of a personal 
representative. The same pattern applies to 
heirs who, in a case where there has been no 
administration discover assets after the 
three-year period has run. Such persons will 
not be able to protect purchasers with the 
ease of those interested in an estate where a 
personal representative has been appointed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-107 (Emphasis added). 
In sum, after reviewing the record in this matter, as well 
as the relevant statutory and case law, the Court finds 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is well taken and grants the same. 
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DATED this A day of January, 2009 
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I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
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cJVi 
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Facsimile: (801)257-7215 
Attorneys For Defendant 
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CAMERON D. MARTINO, AKA DAVID M. CAMERON; AND THE ESTATE 
OF CAMERON D. MARTINO AKA 
DAVID M. CAMERON, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
CASE NUMBER 080915531 
JUDGE JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. 
This matter comes before the Court on the motion of the putative estate and/or next of kin 
of Cameron Martino, David Martino, to dismiss the current action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Oral arguments were heard on January 9. 2009, and the Court 
issued its Memorandum Decision, which was filed on January 21, 2009, and which is 
incorporated herein. Therefore, having fully considered the motion, the memoranda submitted 
by the parties, the oral arguments, and the law, the Court now makes the following: 
FINDINGS AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
The following facts are not in dispute and therefore the Court finds: this matter arises 
from an accident that occurred on September 23, 2003; the driver who would have been the 
proper defendant, Cameron Martino, died on December 3, 2003; no probate or other proceeding 
to appoint a personal representative was ever filed; and this matter was not filed until more than 
three years after the death of Cameron Martino. Therefore, the Court finds that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-3-104 prohibits a claim against a decedent or his successors until a personal representative 
is be appointed, and § 75-3-107 prohibits an action to appoint such a representative more than 
three years from the decedent's death. The plaintiffs claims must therefore fail as a matter of 
law. Therefore, the Court orders the above entitled matter to be dismissed. 
DATED this |~) Day of [ v j ? 2009. 
BY THE COURT 
^ k Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form 
Mark T. Flickenger 
Brett R. Boulton 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 27th day of January 2009 served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing proposed ORDER OF DISMISSAL, by United States first class 
mail, upon: 
Mark T. Flickinger, Esq. 
Brett R. Boulton, 10802 
FLICKINGER & SUTTERFIELD 
3000 North University Avenue, #300 
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PARTIES. JURISDICTION. AND VENUE 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Utah County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant Cameron Dr Martino, aka David M. Cameron, ("Defendant Martino") 
was a resident of Utah County, State of Utah. 
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3. The acts upon which this Complaint is based occurred in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. 
4. Defendant passed away December 3,2003, at the age of 22, in Utah County due 
to 
causes unrelated to this auto accident. 
5. Plaintiff timely filed his Coraplaint against Defendant in this matter on September 
14,2007. 
6. Plaintiffs Complaint was dismissed without prejudice on February 27, 2008, 
for failure to serve. 
7. No probate was executed with respect to Defendant's estate. 
8. Plaintiff brings the present action against the Estate of Cameron. D. Martino aka 
David M. Cameron pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75~3-8Q3(4)(b). 
9. Pursuant to Article VU, §5 of the Utah Constitution and U . C J \ . § 7 8 « 3 - 4 ( 1) and 
(3), this Court has jurisdiction over this case. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
10. On or about September 23,2003, Plaintiff was traveling eastbound on 3300 South 
and stopped at the intersection of 900 Bast in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
U- Defendant Martino was also traveling eastbound on 3300 South directly behind 
plaintiff Berneau. 
12. As the light turned green and traffic proceeded forward, Defendant Martino 
negligently failed to keep a proper lookout and collided with Plaintiffs vehicle, pushing bim 
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forward into a third vehicle. 
13. As a proximate cause of Defendant Martino's negligence, Plaintiff suffered 
personal injuries including but not limited to: two disc herniations causing severe spinal stenosis 
at C3-4 and C4-5; stabbing shoulder pain; numbness and tingling in right hand; chronic 
headaches and bilateral radiculopathy in lower extremity, including pain and numbness in his 
back. 
14. As a result thereof, Plaintiff has incurred, special damages for which he shall be 
entitled to recover in an amount not yet fully ascertained but is at least $9,350.89. 
15. Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Defendants the special damages referred to 
herein for medical expenses and for travel expenses incurred in driving to and from the various 
medical providers. 
16. As a further direct and proximate result of the accident, Plaintiff has suffered pain 
and suffering and a loss of enjoyment of life, significant emotional distress, and permanent 
injury, for which general damages he is entitled to recover from Defendants in the proceeding. 
17. Plaintiff also may incur other additional medical expenses in connection with his 
treatment for injuries suffered from this accident which he should recover from Defendant in this 
proceeding. 
18. Plaintiff is entitled to interest on all special damages as allowed by law, court 
costs, and other relief as may be deemed proper in the premises. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against above Defendant for special 
damages, general damages, interest on damages, court costs, and other relief as may be proper in 
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tlie premises. 
DATED this 3 / day of July, 200S. 
Plaintiffs address: 
512 North 150 East 
Orem, UT 84057 
FL1CKINGER & SUTTERFIEU), P.C 
M^fkT.FlickingcT ^ ^ 
Brett R. Boulton 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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State Fai i i i ! nsurance Companies 
February , ^ ^OQ 
D\ i ight Flickinger Attorney at, Law 
Flickinger & Sutterfield, P.C 
3000 N, Univ. Ave, Ste 3 00 
Provo, UT 84604 
RE: Claim Number 14 3193-146 
Date of Lost September 23, 2003 
Our Insured : Cameron D Martino 
Your Reference: William Berneau 
Dear Mr, Dwight Flickinger: 
j
 waritd t o follow up with you regarding my telephone conversation 
on October 4, 2007 with your paralegal. We have learned that our 
insured driver, Cameron Martion, passed away i n 20 03 from, 
complications following an illness. 
As no valid claim has been presented against Mr. Martino, we are 
closing our file. Dwight, I ask that if you choose to pursue 
this claim any further that you call me, and then send to me a 
copy of the same correspondence, 




(800) 324-0704 ext, 25830 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 
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State Farm Insurance Cos. 
P.O. Box 339408 
Groeby Co 80633-9408 
HOMG OFFICES: BLOOMfNGTON, ILLINOIS 6171 0-QOOl 
